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Abstract  
The implementation of policies that have sought to involve 
immigrant associations in the development of their countries of 
origin, under the name of co- development, was a novelty in Spain 
during the last decade. This new model of development 
cooperation carried out by the  migrants themselves has  not only 
generated new opportunities for its associations, but also significant 
risks, especially in the field of decentralized cooperation driven by 
autonomous communities. In this article, we present the specific 
case of the Valencian Community, where the co- development 
reached a considerable degree of implementation between 2006 
and 2012. Through the analysis of Valencian co-development 
policies, it is possible to see how immigrant associations have 
actually occupied a secondary place in the new cooperation 
schemes against the NGO Development, while many have 
abandoned their protest to focus on projects and proposals for 
welfare activities. 
 
Resumen 
 La implementacio´n de polı´ticas que han tratado de implicar a 
asoci- aciones inmigrantes en el desarrollo de sus paı´ses de 
origen, bajo el nombre de codesarrollo, fue una novedad en 
Espan˜a durante la pasada de´cada. Este nuevo modelo de 
 cooperacio´n al desarrollo llevado a cabo por los propios migrantes 
ha generado nuevas oportunidades para sus asociaciones, pero 
tambie´n riesgos sig- nificativos, especialmente en el campo de la 
cooperacio´n descentralizada impulsada por las comunidades 
auto´nomas. En el presente art ı´culo, presentamos el caso es- 
pecı´fico de la Comunidad Valenciana, donde el codesarrollo 
alcanzo´ un consider- able grado de implementacio´n entre 2006 y 
2012. Mediante el ana´lisis de las polı´ticas de codesarrollo 
valencianas, es posible ver co´mo las asociaciones de in- migrantes 
han ocupado realmente un lugar secundario en los nuevos 
planes de cooperacio´n contra el Desarrollo de ONG, mientras que 
muchas han abandonado su protesta para centrarse en proyectos y 
propuestas de actividades de bienestar. 
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Introduction 
The term co-development has figured prominently in migration and 
development cooperation in Spain during the first decade of this 
century. After a failed first attempt in 2000, with the design of an 
ambitious Global Program Regulation and Coordination of 
Foreigners and Immigration in Spain (GRECO Plan), which was 
never implemented, in 2005 the Director of the Cooperation Plan 
Spanish retook the co-development as one of its main lines of action, 
and in 2007 the Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration did 
the same. At the same time, different Spanish Autonomous 
Communities have included references to the co-development in 
their own plans and have launched specific funding calls for co-
development projects. In an institutional context in which it has 
sought to promote co-development from government policies, the 
results of this new route (which has often been presented as a new 
form of development cooperation) are still difficult to assess, but have 
been accompanied by numerous reviews. 
In this article, we focus on those reviews which emphasize the 
 connection of co- development with the demobilization of the claims 
of migrants and the momentum of certain useful organizations for 
this purpose. The risks identified in other contexts regarding the 
incorporation of migrants into new transnational development 
schemes (e.g., the Mexican case detailed by Fox, Escala (2005), 
Goldring or Moctezuma) are also noticeable in the Spanish 
experience, and especially in the case of the Autonomous 
Valencian Community, to which we devote much of our work. The 
political construction of a new field of co-development has 
enabled articulate new forms of relationships between the different 
actors involved (government, non-governmental development 
organizations and immigrant associ- ations), while promoting the 
emergence of new organizational profiles (entities oriented, since 
their early beginnings, to co-development for migrants and non- 
migrants) or the creation of new platforms (the case of the 
Federation of the Co- Development and International Cooperation 
in the Valencian Community, herein- after FEDACOD). Similarly, 
the official opening of new methods for co- development funding 
has put many of these organizations in the search for resources by 
presenting projects. However, upon understanding that participation 
in the new field could mean a loss of independence and a loss of the 
ability to pressure their advocacy work and defend the rights of 
migrants, as we illustrate in this article, some immigrant 
associations, and NGO Developments (hereinafter NGOs), have 
decided to stay out of this new field or have entered into 
processes of internal debate. Also, in a context in which migrants 
have not secured full citizenship, organizations have opted for co-
development, and have seen an opportunity to become visible by 
accessing certain areas of representation and dialog, while the 
most critical organizations have seen in this invitation an attempt 
by the administration to weaken their demands for greater rights, 
if not a strategy of political co-optation. Therefore, the classic work 
of Albert Hirschman (1977) becomes relevant for our analysis, in 
terms of the three scenarios for organizations in their relationships 
with the political power: the possible break (exit), the claim (voice) 
and submission (loyalty). As we will see later, the three strategies 
were present in varying degrees between immigrant organizations 
and NGDOs, in their positioning of co-development policies 
promoted by the institutions. 
The first part of the article is devoted to reviewing some of the 
studies that have analyzed the role of migrant organizations in other 
 contexts, particularly based on their engagement in development 
programs and their relationships with other actors. Second, we try to 
do a reconstruction of how it would have gestated a specific field of 
co-development in Spain. Third, we delve into the particular 
context of the Valencian Community, where many of the dynamics 
that have accompanied the political construction of a co-
development field have become particularly visible. Finally, we 
detail the opportunities and risks that co-development policies 
have generated for immigrant associations, making a general 
assessment of the changes they have experienced, including 
established relationships with NGOs themselves, more often in 
terms of dependence on them than the searched associative 
strengthening. To illustrate these issues we handle field data 
obtained by questionnaires and interviews from two investigations 
conducted during 2010 and 2011 in the territory of the Valencian 
Community. 
 
Migrant Organizations, Development and Public Policies 
The revival of the debate on the link between migration and 
development in the first decade of the century has put migrant 
organizations under spotlight, seen as key agents in the 
operationalization of the new political schemes around this area, an 
issue that has not been without controversy. The attempt to 
conceive migrants and their organizations (and processes 
responsible for promoting development in their countries of origin) 
has been criticized by several authors, who argue rather that 
migrants cannot alone constitute a development agent, while this 
proposition results in ‘‘unsustainable level processes reaching 
social transformation’’ (Delgado and Ma´rquez, 2007, p. 22). 
However, the idea that migration can play a positive role in the 
development if framed within public policies that help to channel 
their effects properly—we talk here, especially in the first instance, 
about remittances from migrants—has gained remarkable strength, 
and has been accompanied by the exaltation of the migrant 
organized as an actor in this new scenario, associated in this task 
with large international organizations, states and even the private 
sector. Inside this new triangulation in the transnational social space 
between community, market and state spoken of by Faist (2005), 
 migrant organizations have gained significant value for both the 
states of origin and receiving states. For the former, the always 
complex relationship with diaspora has evolved toward normalization 
of ties and attempts to attract them toward programs that ensure 
their involvement, to varying degrees, in development (for example 
the more travel 3X1 Program in Mexico, or the latest in El Salvador, 
Colombia or Ecuador). For the latter, cases have varied 
considerably, especially in a number of European countries, 
including Spain, as we will see later, and a new agent development 
cooperation has been implemented in regions which now also 
receive the migrants themselves. In this sense, for both states of 
origin and receiving states, the possibility of structuring the 
participation of migrants across their organizations has proved to be 
a catalyst for new officers’ devices and in turn has generated new 
relationships with transnational migrants as development actors. 
However, these new relationships raise the question about the 
place that has been attributed to migrant organizations and, above 
all, the changes that have occurred in the organizations to adjust to 
new schemes. 
In the literature on transnational migrant organizations the 
analysis of these organizations as well as their practices has been 
privileged, but the impact of the relationship with government 
agencies that guide their actions has barely been investigated. 
Similarly, most studies addressing the relationship of states’ 
organized diasporas have investigated from the point of view of the 
countries of origin rather than the receiving states. Many states 
have maintained policies or programs designed to try to influence 
behavior, including political behavior of their citizens abroad (see 
the case of Mexico1), but only a few states have developed policies 
to influence organizational behavior—sometimes also with policy—
of the migrants settled in their territory. 
Faist’s review on the role of transnational migrants as agents of 
development indicates how different states—including some 
European and international orga- nizations—have recently turned 
his gaze to migrant associations to become ‘‘diasporic actors’’ 
(2008, p. 26). This renewed interest in his judgment contains 
important background issues such as the tension between the role 
                                                          
1
 The case of Mexico has been one of the most reviewed into the scientific literature, 
with a long list of works like Gonzalez–Gutierrez (2006), Goldring (2002) or Guanizo 
(1998). 
 of transnational migrants as agents of development and political 
interests, and control of the states of origin and destination (2008, 
p. 36). Another key study within the analysis of transnational 
immigrant organizations—the Portes, Escobar and Walton report— 
discusses the growing initiatives by governments seeking to channel 
the activities of migrants (remittances, investments and 
philanthropic contributions) or simply to ensure their loyalty. Portes 
and his collaborators posit then that ‘‘according to the scope and 
material resources allocated by governments as well as the 
purposes for which they are used, immigrant organizations can 
accept and adopt the official line, stay independent of it or actively 
resist it as an unwanted interference’’ (2006, p. 14). Meanwhile, 
Fox and Gois, from the Mexican case, referring to the role of 
migrant civil society, warn of the risks that participation in official 
schemes can entail for the organizations themselves, either by 
integration in the same project (concentration in a few states where 
migrant organizations have a direct influence on policy), state 
governments or by the exclusion of those organizations that are 
more critical to the development agenda (for example, those 
immigrant associations campaigning against the violation of human 
rights in Mexico) or who are in favor of broader development policies, 
and may well be excluded from the program One by Three (2010, p. 
115). On this issue Goldring goes even further, noting the Mexican 
state’s attempts to establish a clientele and coopting relationship 
with its diaspora abroad, through its policies and programs for 
migrant organizations (2002, p. 78).  
What we can see through the studies cited is how conflicts 
between community and state in the terminology of Faist can arise 
when migrant organizations have different objectives to those of 
government agencies that promote government programs, 
including different interpretations of participation within them. To 
Faist, this new scenario is a source of friction between the different 
actors involved, but also constitutes what he calls a space of 
opportunity, while linking development policies—including migration 
and border policies—especially in the European context, meaning a 
possibility that groups and transnational partnerships receive 
prominence and reach some power. So, because these public 
policies do not just focus on the returning of migrants as a way to 
promote development, but also in promoting transnational 
networks, migrants and their organizations would be willing to 
assume a growing role (2005, p. 30). 
 In the case that we are studying, first and foremost, the relations 
of the Spanish government agencies, and above all the relations of 
the sub-national agencies (regional and local) with immigrant 
associations, the guidelines mentioned above are particularly 
appropriate. We try to show that the emergence of a formal co- 
development field, driven from official authorities, would have had, 
as one of its achievements, a greater public visibility of immigrant 
associations, but the price in many of the cases is a loss of 
autonomy in the debate on the development agenda and a shift 
toward actions based solely on projects. 
 
The Emergence and Transformation of Co-development in 
Spain 
In 2000 the concept of co-development made its first official 
appearance in Spain through the GRECO Plan, and has since been 
under intense discussion. Today, the discussion is still open and 
many still debate over whether the co-development is a tool, a 
specific methodology, a perspective, a form of development 
cooperation, or a management tool. Amid the lack of consensus, 
some authors argue that it is a hybrid concept, which encompasses 
the phenomenon of migration and development cooperation and is 
positively linking migration and development, starting from the 
premise that migration generates power or development (Gime´nez 
2004). Corte´s (2006) points out in turn that it is a polysemic 
concept, as it is understood and manipulated by different actors 
(international organizations, states from the central government, 
regional/regional or local NGOs, immigrant associations, immigrants 
and their families, etc.) in a different and concerned way. There is no 
chance here to present and discuss the different meanings 
attributed to the co-development to exceed the scope of this work; 
rather, what interests us here is to trace what might be the main 
features of the Spanish co-development model and its evolution in 
the short period of just 10 years. 
For the first question, the very fact that co-development in 
Spain has built momentum from the field of development 
cooperation from their own migration policy has mostly promoted 
the ways of development cooperation whose purpose is aimed at 
fighting poverty and, more specifically, lowering socioeconomic 
 differences between countries of origin, transit and destination of 
migration by promoting human development. This approach would 
be accompanied by the conception of migrants as agents of 
development and co-starred in the process of co-development with a 
wide network of stakeholders, both public and private, located at 
origin and destination. According to Corte´s and San Martin (2007), 
the most significant contribution to Spanish co-development would 
be to simply build a ‘‘model to three,’’ which would have the actors 
represent the migrants themselves through their associations, public 
administrations and NGOs. Networking between the three parties 
and the formulation of action at source under this scheme would be 
the main components that accompany the development of co-
development in Spain. 
As for evolution, co-development has experienced a rapid and 
intense course, which has happened in little more than 10 years, 
first involving the distrust of immigrant associations and also many 
NGOs, a key characteristic of the decade (when the co-
development was seen as an instrument to facilitate the return of 
migrants, or when the NGOs saw in immigrant associations too a 
potential competitor) to a stage in the middle of the decade in which 
many of the immigrant associations and NGOs themselves agreed 
to participate in the implementation of projects or platforms 
prompted, without renouncing co-development, while also keeping 
a vigilant eye on it (e.g., the creation in 2007 of the Network of 
Immigrant Associations by co-development, REDCO). Finally, when 
the co-development was said to have reached its mature stage, 
reviews seemed to have reduced their intensity and both public 
institutions and civil society organizations in the co-development 
saw an opportunity to influence the development from different 
schemes through the cooperation of the classical development. The 
deep economic crisis in Spain right now has led to a significant 
reduction in public budgets and the difficulties faced by the 
organizations themselves have significantly lowered social 
expectations, to the point of precipitating discourse on the future of 
co-development.2   
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 In fact most of the official calls out that have been created to specifically support 
projects of co- development have disappeared. This is the case of the Valencian 
Community where the last call out was publicized in 2012. 
  
Unable to say yet what the extent of the effect of an ongoing 
crisis on the co- development field will be, we do want to highlight 
here that some of the discussions over the years have been on the 
basis of distance from various immigrant associations and NGOs 
regarding the co-development in order to help better understand 
the case we will present later. 
First, a large number of authors have seen co-development as 
something propelled by administrations: the top security concerns 
and the issue of returning immigrants (Go´ mez, 2008), both inside 
and outside of Spain. For example, in France, reviews have also 
been frequent (France has the same origin of co- development as 
a concept and state policy as Spain) and, as Bayart pointed out, 
although co-developments were originally intended to involve civil 
society and migrants with official development assistance, it 
would be progressively trans- formed in what he called an anti-
migration device (Bayart 2007, p. 26). Daum delves further into 
this matter, and highlights the ambiguity between the 
development of countries of origin and management of migration 
flows, and questions for whom the official co-development seems 
to be more oriented to organize the cooperation of countries of 
origin in the control of immigration with a repressive vocation 
(Daum 2008, p. 58). 
In Spain, the first formulations contained in the GRECO Plan, 
taking as a reference the French co-development model and the 
guidelines for the creation of an area of freedom, security and 
justice in the European Union (Treaty of Amsterdam Treaty 
Tampere), had a fairly close proximity with strictly secured 
approaches (Lacomba and Boni 2008). With the entry into 
government of the Spanish Socialist Party in 2004, the GRECO 
Plan was repealed, but it had already taken root. From this point 
the co-development began acquiring a special role in state 
development cooperation and gradually separated from the safety 
objectives. References to co- development first appeared in a 
Director of the Spanish Cooperation, the 2005–2008 Plan, and in 
the respective Annual Plans for International Cooperation (PACI). 
Second, note that since the sub-national authorities’ involvement, 
this dichotomy between co-development linked to security and co-
development objectives linked to the participation of immigrants has 
  
not been raised to the same degree. The regional and local 
administrations have tended to focus more on co-development as a 
form of participation of immigrants and even on a destination-
integration approach, which has not been without problems and 
tensions. It is precisely one of these sub-state administrations, the 
regional government of Valencia (Generalitat Valenciana), which 
draws our attention on the following topics, in order to illustrate 
that the framework of relations between administration, immigrant 
associations and development organizations is subject to many 
tensions and contradictions. 
 
Discourse and Practice of Official Co-development in 
Valencia 
As Go´mez Gil (2007) points out, 2005 could be considered the 
year of the emergence of co-development in the budgets of the 
regional and local cooperation in Spain.  From that date, co-
development has  been a gaining presence in the regional plans 
for cooperation, integration and immigration, and different 
municipalities have established programs and provided funding in 
co-development. At the regional level, there are several 
communities that include references to co- development or make 
references to migratory flows in their cooperative laws (Balearic 
Islands, Murcia, or less explicitly Castilla-La Mancha). In contrast, 
other regions, such as Catalonia, Madrid, Basque Country, 
Aragon and Valencia even contemplate co-development within 
their respective master plans of cooperation for development. 
The Valencian Autonomous Region Act Development 
Cooperation, adopted in 2007, introduced its own definition of co-
development understood as an instrument of development 
cooperation under the following formulation: ‘‘It’s about the set of 
transnational and inter-institutional actions aimed at promoting the 
involvement and active participation of the immigrant people with 
greater presence in the Valencian Community, in order to promote 
their potential as agents of development in their countries of origin, 
in coordination with other social organizations and local authorities. 
It includes, among other things, training, advice and technical 
assistance, as well as strengthening immigrant organizations and 
community origin; education and awareness of the Valencian 
 society on the causes of the immigrant population and the value of 
cultural diversity are also included’’ (Law 6/2007 of 9 February, 
Development Cooperation of the Valencian Community). 
This definition of the co-development proposal for a state 
government’s sub- entity assumes, on the one hand, its increasing 
relocation on the agendas of non- central government departments 
(what might be called decentralization of co- development) and on 
the other hand, allows us to see the reorientation of co-
development in the search for its social dimension and 
integration. At the same time, the exercise defining and providing 
innovations to co-development (to some extent), in Valencia, 
shows it is one of the pioneers in this field (something that the 
Valencian Government has been doing in recent years). Proof of 
this is the establishment in the year 2006 of the first specific call 
for co-development project funding or momentum in creating 
spaces and platforms for organizations in the areas of migration 
and co-development (the first creation of the Forum Immigration 
and, later, of the Federation of the International Co-Development 
and Cooperation, FEDACOD). 
This priority given to co-development will be reinforced in the 
Master Plan 2008–2011,3 which introduces a significant shift by 
directly linking the development cooperation programs with 
integration of immigrants made by the Generalitat Valenciana, 
giving a boost to the co-development (Ibarra and Santander, 
2012, p. 70). From then the co-development will form part of the 
strategic priority policy lines of the Generalitat, in the field of 
development cooperation (through the Master Plan for Cooperation  
Valencia  2008–2011), as the  scope  of the integration  of 
immigrants (through the Director of immigration and Coexistence 
Plan 2008–2011). As can be seen in Table 1, the co-development 
funds have increased substantially relative  to  other  lines  of  
cooperation  subsidy  by  the  Generalitat  Valenciana, especially in 
2011 and 2012, where in the midst of a drastic reduction of the 
other items intended for cooperation, co-development showed a 
much smaller decline, which  made  it  possible  to  devote  44 %  
of  the  total  money  of  development cooperation. 
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 In the next Valencian Cooperation Plan Director (2014-2017) any reference to 
co-development or migration have been disappear. 
  
 
 
Table 1. Evolution of the different chapters of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) distributed in public 
calls by the Generalitat Valenciana and percentage dedicated to co-development 
 
Year Development Sensibilizati
on 
Training 
and 
research 
Humanit
arian 
action 
Co- 
developm
ent 
Total 
awaren
ess 
Percentage 
dedicated to 
co-
development 
2006 10.963.146 990.992 1.190.880 – 1.308.734 14.453.732 9.55 
2007 14.735.989 1.299.991 1.802.644 – 2.263.848 20.102.472 11.26 
2008 37.825.043 3.919.975 6.109.929 4.090.488 4.153.137 56.098.572 7.04 
2009 31.289.159 2.766.950 1.556.678 2.171.294 3.480.677 41.264.758 8.43 
2010 13.446.678 2.296.098 1.770.688 2.448.972 3.424.033 23.386.469 14.64 
2011 7.624.561 1.171.001      689.240 1.069.362 3.051.691 13.605.855 22.42 
2012 1.375.178 1.165.300 – – 2.305.387 5.145.300 44.80 
Total 162.160.935 17.400.031 18.878.057 9.780.116 20.182.120   
Source Compiled from the 2006–2012 resolutions calls. The data in the tables is limited to the period 2006–2012, 
starting and ending years of calls for projects of co- development. From the year 2012 there was reissued a call for 
that purpose 
  
 
However, this budget which benefits the co-development effort 
also hides troubling elements: first, the transfer of funds from 
development cooperation to the new chapter of co-development; 
second, the increased competition for resources between the 
different organizations involved in the field of co-development. 
In this context, most of the funds for the co-development, as in the 
case with decentralized cooperation in general, will be received and 
administered mainly by the NGOs, and will be better positioned to 
meet their own criteria. In fact, the Partnership Act 2007 refers to 
the following actors: NGOs, Valencian universities, trade unions, 
enterprises and business organizations, but not to immigrant 
associations.4 Therefore, many of these associations will begin to 
make changes to their charters to access co-development funds, 
which is a major organizational change, accompanied by internal 
debates on whether or not this operation (between  who see an 
opportunity in change and those who see in it the loss of the 
idiosyncrasies of the associations). 
 
It is true, as Iborra and Santander (2012) say, that access to 
the calls for co- development has not been as restrictive as in the 
case of other criteria—although it is impossible to have a clear 
pattern of calls since the criteria have varied over the period 2006–
20125—but it is undeniable that, in the majority of cases, those who 
have managed the funds of the calls have not been the associations 
of immigrants (they have not even been converted immigrant 
                                                          
4
 As specified in the Act 6/2007 of the Government and the Director of the Cooperation 
Plan 2008-2011 Valenciana are considered agents of international development 
cooperation in Valencia, institutions and entities that meet the following criteria: be an 
organization legal personality and legal capacity to act in accordance with current 
legislation in the field of international development cooperation; be non-profit; having 
registered office or permanent delegation in the Valencian Community; have among its 
purposes or express purpose, as shown in its statutes or equivalent, performing 
activities of international development cooperation and humanitarian action; have a 
structure capable enough to ensure the fulfillment of its objectives; the principles, 
objectives and performance criteria laid down in Chapter I of this Act. 
5 Also has been changing the geographical location of the projects, from the early 
years when it was limited to the 13 countries with the largest immigration in 
Valencia until 2012, where there is no limitation. 
 
  
associations in NGDOs) (Table 2). A detailed analysis of the 
successful bidders of the calls reveals that, to a greater extent, the 
NGOs and Foundations that were better positioned and had already 
been working in the field of development cooperation were awarded 
most of the projects and the largest amount of public funding.  
So, as shown in Table 3 among the 10 states  with  the  greatest  
number  of  projects  funded  by  the  calls  for  the  years  2006–
2012 are five foundations: three NGOs and two immigrant 
associations (the most prominent cases being those of ACSUD-Las 
Segovias NGOs and the Save the Children Foundation, who received 
grants for their projects in six of the seven calls, plus some of the 
highest amounts). The analysis of the figures allows us to speak 
beyond the official discourse on co-development and on the need 
to support and strengthen immigrant associations, a clearly unequal 
distribution of resources for the co-development between them and 
NGOs. This finding coincides with what St. Martin notes in his 
study of the city of Madrid, where he concludes that ‘‘it seems 
evident that there is a distance between the insistence on formal 
declarations, plans and projects, the relevance and the key role of 
migrants, and their effective recognition in the proceedings ‘‘ (2011, 
p. 95). 
In terms of strengthening associative, picked as a priority in the 
regional definition of co-development, one should also refer to the 
effects that access to calls for co-development has had on the 
associations of immigrants and the creation of partnerships with 
NGOs. Thus, both the Director of Immigration and Coexistence Plan 
2008–2011, as well as the Director of the Valencia Cooperation 
Plan 2008–2011, establish as program goals the strengthening and 
revitalization of immigrant associations. The Master Plan for 
Cooperation itself goes even further and states that ‘‘a specific 
policy will be promoted in co-development, involving immigrants in 
the work of development of their countries of origin, including 
training and education, awareness and especially their participation 
in development projects and programs promoted by the Government, 
in coordination with the social cooperation of Valencia’’ (Generalitat 
Valenciana 2008, p. 9). In addition, ‘‘those programs and projects 
that incorporate immigrants living in the Valencian Region in the 
processes of identification, design, implementation and evaluation 
thereof will prevail; and, in particular, the participation of non-profit 
entities is valued and legally constituted to include, among its 
  
social purposes, care and support for immigrants’’ (Generalitat 
Valenciana 2008, p. 49). 
 
Table 2. Approved projects and joint development projects submitted 
by immigrant associations 
Year  Number of projects      Number of projects      Total number of 
 approved NGOs approved inmigrant      projects approve 
   associations 
 
2006 11 1 12 
2007 11 1 12 
2008 15 4 19 
2009 15 1 16 
2010 10 2 12 
2011 14 8 22 
2012 7 3 10 
Total 83 20 103 
  
 
Source Compiled from the resolutions of the calls for co-development 
2006–2012 
This approach, which in principle could make a positive reading, 
has also had its lights and shadows. While in some cases it has led 
to the progressive acquisition of autonomy for some immigrant 
associations against the NGOs, other associations have been 
relegated to an instrumental level within projects, when we have 
not considered their faults thoroughly. In this sense, one of the most 
successful cases of cooperation between NGOs and immigrant 
association has been the collaboration between the NGO ACSUD-
Las Segovia and The Association of Ecuadorian indigenous 
immigrants Intin˜an. In this process, this association was strengthened 
not only organizationally in Spain through participation in various 
co-development projects,6 but also acquired a significant social and 
political involvement in the same country of origin through the 
creation of the Jatari Foundation (the Foundation works toward 
development in Saraguro, Ecuador). Instead, the case of 
collaboration between the NGO Association Valenciana Refugee 
Aid and the Association of Moroccan Immigrant of Tendrara 
(ASIMT) illustrates a different story, since the association of 
immigrants could grow through funded projects, but collapsed when 
the NGO entered an acute organizational and financial crisis. 
Another example of a different approach is the cooperation 
between the NGO CEAR Foundation and a group of associations 
of Moroccan immigrants in the Valencian Community 
(Transnational Net Valencia-Nador-Oujda), who sought to create a 
platform partnerships for co-development which was unsuccessful, 
mainly due to mistrust between the parties and the perception that 
the associations were only used for the purposes of the NGO. 
These three examples highlight the opportunity represented for 
the co-development partnership between the NGOs present in 
the host society and immigrant associations, but also the risks of 
a partnership in which the participants are not placed at the same 
level or do not share the same goals. 
                                                          
6
 Having included as a partner in projects the NGO ACSUD-the Segovias calls for co-
development in 2011 and 2012 the association of Indian immigrants saw 
Saraguros Intin˜an first approved a draft submitted as applicant entity 
  
Table 3. Institutions with the highest number of co-development 
projects funded 
Entity Number of projects 
Foundation Save The Children 6 
ONGD ACSUD-Las Segovias 6 
Foundation Ceimigra 5 
Foundation CEAR 5 
Foundation Iuve 5 
Association ACULCO 5 
ONGD Jarit 5 
Foundation Agricultores Solidarios 4 
ONGD Assembly of Cooperation for Peace 4 
Association AESCO 4 
Source Compiled from the resolutions of the calls for co-development 
2006–2012 
 
We return to compare the above with the work of San Martı´n, 
who said ‘‘the model is that it seems more consolidated starring 
NGDOs, the projects they are  working with, more public support 
and more robust infrastructure. Meanwhile, the associations remain 
weaker players, those who currently help in certain aspects of the 
project as an extra contribution to the NGO. We find, therefore, 
the work of voluntarism versus associative professionalized and 
structured NGOs, who today promote some projects that drive 
administration which previously competed in terms of inequality’’ 
(2011, pp. 94–95). In short, those who would have benefited to a 
greater extent include an industry tech with resources to attain the 
type of grants that require capabilities that immigrant associations 
usually do not have, something that is also true in the case of the 
Valencian Community. 
 
Immigrant Associations to Co-development as an 
Opportunity 
As we saw, while the original idea of co-development has as its 
  
main goal converting immigrant associations into genuine agents 
of transnational develop- ment, it is something easier said than 
done. To illustrate how co-development has represented—
borrowing Faist terminology—a space of opportunity that has not 
always produced the desired results, we present some significant 
results of two studies conducted in the Valencian Community.7 Our 
aim was to analyze what kind of migrant associations are taking 
actions that decide co-development and what their motivations are, 
while at the same time find out why others have chosen not to 
participate in official co-development schemes (see Table 4). 
According to the investigation, the first significant result revealed 
that the co- development is actually a small part  of the activity of  
immigrant  associations (among all immigrant associations present 
in Valencia, only 16 % of the total have been involved in activity 
related to co-development in recent years), although the latter was 
placed strongly in its own imagery and language, and is an area of 
future work for many of the these associations. 
Also, in trying to reconstruct a profile of those immigrant 
associations that have seen in co-development an opportunity and 
have been active in this field, we can speak of ‘prone to co-
development’ partnerships that share a number of common 
elements8: organizations implemented at national and international 
level, with a wide range of institutional relations in both the host 
country and country of origin, while the sources of financing are 
government subsidies and grants. Furthermore, the association 
profile not involved in co-development is instead determined by 
existing local organizations whose institutional relations are 
specified and have limited space at the same establishment, and 
                                                          
7
 We base our analysis on seven paths of investigations in Valencia during the 
period 2009-2010, combining quantitative and qualitative fieldwork. For the 
quantitative part, a survey took place aimed at establishing the profile of immigrant 
associations in Valencia (the questionnaire was answered by 81 associations of a 
total sample of 220). For the qualitative part, interviews with 23 key informants of 
supportive organizations and immigrant associations were conducted. 
8
 To do this, we used the analysis of multiple correspondence, taking into account 
whether the organization is involved in co-development project, its scope of 
implementation, the profile according to the degree of relationship with other institutions 
of the host country, the profile according to the degree of relationship with other 
institutions in the country and, finally, the profile according to the sources of funding. 
From the Cartesian diagram based on the relationship between the variables 
analyzed, we can distinguish which variables explain participation or not in the co-
development. 
  
whose source of funding depends more on the rate of partners and 
activities throughout the year. In a second correspon- dence 
analysis, from the year of establishment of the organization and the 
funding source and the degree of participation in the action itself, 
we have seen how these variables are closely related to the type 
of co-development. The latter correspon- dence analysis allowed us 
to see several things: 1) the most recently created associations 
involved in co-development, created from 2006, especially set in 
motion aid actions that would be individually driven and financed 
from their own funds (as we shall see later, when discussing the 
creation of FEDACOD, this would agree with the profile willing 
partnerships that integrate the new platform entity); 2) associations 
with an intermediate length of existence, created between 2001 
and 2005, have fundamentally linked their co-development 
projects to training, employment and social economy; 3) 
associations with longer life, created before 2001, have developed 
actions in a group with some NGOs, especially co- development 
projects related to microcredit. 
Overall, the analysis reveals that the profile of immigrant 
associations involved in the field of co-development is entities with 
numerous partners, has implementation at national and international 
level, and possesses a good network of contacts with institutions 
both in countries of origin and destination. At the same time, they 
are more socially active, presenting a greater number of institutional 
relations with the public administration, as well as businesses and 
other organizations in civil society. However, even if they are 
organizations with numerous partners, the percentage share of the 
social base is also very low. In this regard, as noted by Masanet 
and Santacreu (2010), job insecurity and the limited availability of the 
immigrants’ time makes participation limited in many cases by the 
members of the board. 
On the other hand, and although most immigrant associations 
obtain funds through share partners, the organizations involved in 
co-development depend rather on aid and public subsidies, while ‘‘on 
many occasions maintenance and survival of the associations are 
subject to obtaining public funding’’ (Masanet and Santacreu 2010, 
p. 68). Likewise, if we take a closer look at the public licensee 
institution of such aid, we can observe that 90.9 % of the 
associations involved in co- development activities obtain 
autonomic government funds, followed by the local (63.3 %) and 
  
state (54.5 %). 
The dependence on public subsidies—especially those of 
regional origin—is remarkable. The risks that may be involved for 
immigrant associations are also important, and can be 
substantiated both in the economic and the political spheres. In the 
economic field the most obvious risk is, as we have seen, the 
effect of the crisis on the reduction of subsidies that has been 
recently produced, even with the disappearance of associations 
that could not support themselves financially. Politically, the risk is 
rather refocusing the agenda of the centrality of partnerships and 
projects and welfare activities to the detriment of the defense of the 
rights of immigrants. 
In fact, for those immigrant associations that we can catalog as 
more ‘‘critical’’ of the official co-development system, their 
involvement in it would amount to a submission to the 
administration’s own agenda without those immigrant associa- 
tions having had the opportunity to take part in the system’s 
preparation. For example, one of the organizations linked to the 
defense of the rights of immigrants in Valencia expressed its 
refusal to carry out projects of co-development funded with public 
money: 
We have been interested in this issue for six years. We are interested, 
but there is a homogeneous view of all the board members and the 
intention or need to work on that line. The statute says that issues 
are new to us. Companions of our directors have participated in 
courses to design co-development projects, which we found 
interesting, and we are trying to do. But as we said, we know the 
government is best limited. That’s why we came out; the fact is that 
we will make our own co-development regardless of these people or 
the government (Interview Ecuadorian Association Juan Montalvo). 
The reasons for the estrangement of some immigrant associations 
are also extended to the reviews that have emerged regarding the 
ineffectiveness of international cooperation itself as well as the 
identification of co-development as a new variant of the latter. 
Perhaps for this reason, certain associations have initially preferred 
to continue their actions according to their own priorities and their 
own measures, without necessarily resorting to subsidies offered 
by the different administrations: 
What we’ve worked for so  slightly, is from the  organization, funded  
  
by voluntary Contributions from partners. For example […] was 
donated to the school bus in a town […]. Children not attending school 
because, as they come down the mountain, they have to walk for two, 
or sometimes three, hours. This bus makes a journey that takes them 
to school and does not leave them at home alone because there 
are places in the house they are not permitted to enter. So this bus 
was donated from Rumin˜ahui. Like last year, when it gave shelter to a 
school […] as needed…there had been heavy rains, and it was not 
able  […]  But  that  is  money  from  the  partners  (Interview  
Ecuadorian Association Rumin˜ahui). 
 
Table 4. Immigrant associations with co-development projects 
funded Year    Immigrant associations and their original countries 
2006   ACULCO (Colombia) 
2007   AESCO (Colombia) 
2008   ACULCO (Colombia), AESCO (Colombia), Asociacio´n Socio-
Cultural Macodou Ssall (Senegal) 2009   Asociacio´n Socio-Cultural 
Macodou Ssall (Senegal) 
2010   ACULCO (Colombia), AESCO (Colombia) 
2011   ACULCO (Colombia), Entreiguales (Colombia), Intin˜a´n 
(Ecuador), Acolvalle (Colombia), Asociacio´n Valenciana de 
Inmigrantes, AESCO (Colombia), Rumin˜ahui (Ecuador), 
ASOFLOES (Colombia) 
2012   ACULCO (Colombia), Intin˜a´n (Ecuador), Wafae (Marruecos) 
 
Source Compiled from the resolutions of the calls for co-development 
2006–2012 
 
The result is that despite the opportunity it has represented, in the co-
development in Valencia certain immigrant associations have 
preferred to stay out of new policies or are skeptical about them. 
This is something that has also been detected in other parts of 
Spain, as shown in the study of Ostergaard-Nielsen (2011) in 
  
Catalonia, where it is concluded that the general position of migrants 
is positive concerning the idea of their involvement in development 
projects in their hometowns; but they also raised skepticism 
concerning the ways of implementation of co-development. 
Immigrant associations investigated here think they are labeled as 
participants with no real ability to influence anything, while the 
development community is criticized for placing migrants in a 
development agenda that they have not built, without the ability to 
influence the political process that has set the parameters for their 
collaboration (2011, p. 32). 
 
From the Opportunities to the Risks of Cooptation in the 
FEDACOD Case 
The induced character of official co-development raises many 
questions about its effects on associations and practices. Co-
development policies can provide an opportunity to strengthen 
immigrant associations by putting them under the spotlight of the 
authorities, but this is not guaranteed. The policy orientation by 
spurious interests can also generate risks to the organizations in 
terms of cooptation (Moctezuma 2011). In any case, the integration 
of official co-development schemes is not an aseptic operation, 
especially when these schemes have been conceived in a political 
context that seeks to achieve certain goals and includes 
organizations that can respond to them. 
The case of co-development policy implemented in recent years 
in the Valencia Community shows the limits that have been 
identified for the policies of many countries in relation to the 
organizations of their citizens abroad (the case of Mexico, for 
example). Attempts to establish policies and design devices that try 
to frame the work of the organizations are not at all neutral. The 
formulation of certain policies not only has the effect of favoring 
certain kinds of actions, but also favors certain organizations that 
have lower resistance to the new proposals. The present case is of 
special interest, involving processes occurring in the country of 
destination of migrants and not in the country of origin, where these 
dynamics have received increased attention. It is often pointed out 
that the political culture of most developed countries is taken as a 
migration pull, and can act as a factor of change in organizational 
  
practices of migrants, giving them democratizing elements 
(mechanisms of election and representation, accountability accounts, 
transparency…). However, this is something that should not be 
assumed, without regard to the local context in which organizations 
take root and grow (the political ecosystem). The particular case of 
Valencia demonstrates that most of the risks identified regarding the 
policies of the state of origin in relation to organizations of the 
diaspora, means we can find them present here in their own 
policies designed in the context of reception. 
Unlike what happened in the 90 s, when in Valencia a small 
number of associations (the Association of Moroccan immigrants 
Al-Amal or association of Latin American immigrants ARI-Peru) had 
a prominent role in the mobilization of immigrants for their rights, 
together with other organizations such as the Bureau of Entities 
(Immigrant Solidarity) in recent years the advocacy work has 
moved into second place on the agenda of many of the new 
immigrant associations who have been devoted  to co-
development. For many of the  newest  associations,  where 
partnerships have been created around new groups from 
Colombia, Ecuador and Romania, development organizations have 
also emerged from the same collective. Their growing public 
recognition without needing for it to be accompanied by greater 
advocacy capacity has been considered in itself an achievement in 
finding a space within the receiving society. 
In this context, many of the associations have tended to stand 
as depoliticized organizations with a more technical background, 
focusing on project-based actions and attention, assistance, and 
largely relegating mobilization efforts, as seen in the previous 
section. However, as Fox and Gois remind us, that option is no 
longer just a political choice or, as they say, ‘‘the fact it prioritizes 
local projects in the short term is clearly a political decision’’ (2010, 
p. 115). On this issue, both authors write, concerning the Mexican 
case, that in advocacy on migration and development, there are 
differences of agenda between those focusing on trans-local 
projects and those who, on the other hand, focus on broader public 
policy. The first position can be characterized as more ‘‘pragmatic’’ 
and the second as more ‘‘political.’’ A focus on projects involves a 
couple of advantages: the ability to produce tangible results in the 
short term with little risk of confrontation with the government of the 
country of origin. It  also allows HTAs to be  linked directly with 
  
local governments  and communities on native soil. Instead, civil 
advocacy centered alternative develop- ment policies involve 
broader approaches, both in terms of scale and time, as well as less 
accurate possible links between reforms and their impact on certain 
sectors of the population in certain places’’ (Fox and Gois 2010, pp. 
114–115). 
The finding is that more ‘‘pragmatism’’ (referred to by Fox and 
Gois) is accompanied by the creation of new spaces of 
representation and participation, and has created new opportunities 
for certain immigrant associations, but also new risks. It would be the 
same risks that other studies have referred to concerning immigrant 
associations in Spain and their integration into platforms of political 
participation promoted by official proceedings, for example in the 
work of Toral (2010) and Veredas (2003) around clienteles and 
political risks of cooptation for immigrant associations  from  the  
creation  of  the  Forum  for  the  Social  Integration  of 
Immigrants, or Gonzalez and Morales (2006) on immigrant 
associations in Madrid. Along this line of investigation, the clearest 
example is perhaps that provided by Guillermo Toral in his study of 
immigrant associations represented at the Forum for the Social 
Integration of Immigrants—a body character state—who concludes 
that ‘‘in Spain, government intervention takes an overly large 
place in the field of immigrant organizations, at least in its current 
configuration. Corporatism that the political opportunity structure 
tends to cause in this country presents many dangers for the 
configuration of a strong civil society, because without a strong 
horizontal network and without an active participation of the 
members of the organizations’ vertical integration organizations can 
serve to tame protests and claims of groups that are excluded from 
political citizenship’’ (Toral 2010, p. 126). 
In this respect, one of the most controversial initiatives in the  
field of co- development in Valencia was the creation in 2010 of 
FEDACOD, composed mainly of new immigrant associations and 
development organizations which also have migrants in prominent 
positions9 Regarding CONGDCV has currently 112 organizations 
within it.  On both platforms  only match two entities: Save The 
Children (an NGO) and ACULCO (an association of immigrants 
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 The Federation claims to have 115 member organizations, a list can be found at the 
following address: http://www.fedacod.org/index.php/acerca-de-fedacod/directorio-
entidades 
  
currently holds the presidency of FEDACOD).. For many NGOs that 
have been working for years in the field of development 
cooperation, the establishment of FEDACOD was interpreted as an 
attempt by the Valencian government of having a counterweight to its 
critical role, organized around the Coordinator NGOs in the 
Valencian Community, and increasingly distanced from the regional 
policies of cooperation for development implemented by the Ministry 
of Solidarity and Citizenship.10 The appearance of FEDACOD 
increased distrust of NGOs regarding immigrant associations and 
their instrumentalization through co-development agenda.11 The 
speeches of a number of NGOs refer to the ‘‘docility’’ of immigrant 
associations, and protest against the attitude of the first ones 
created. 
However, the dividing line is not always so clear and does not 
necessarily involve the division between NGOs and immigrant 
associations, so that among the members of FEDACOD we can also 
find NGOs that do not necessarily have their origin in the middle of 
the migration, as among the organizations most critical of 
FEDACOD lie some of the first immigrant associations that were 
created in the Valencian Community. In this sense, we can say that 
the main differentiating variable between member organizations of 
FEDACOD and non-members does not seem to be the migrant 
component, but the temporal component: the older organizations 
(both migrants and non) have maintained their position of being 
critical, while more  recently established organizations have 
adopted a more harmonious attitude toward regional policies, when 
they would not have been created precisely to align with these 
regional policies. 
What is most obvious is that immigrant associations present in 
FEDACOD have made themselves more visible in the public space 
(although it does not necessarily mean that they have grown 
strong), but at the price of a challenge to their independence from
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 During the last years of the Partido Popular in the Valencian Regional Ministry was 
headed by Rafael Blasco, who currently is judicially condemned, along with other senior 
officials for a possible diversion of funds from international cooperation. 
11
 The appearance of FEDACOD and co-development grants have also been 
addressed to the Valencian local press. See: www.levante-emv.com/comunitat-
valenciana/…/799485.html 
  
 
 
Table 5. Entities belonging to FEDACOD codevelopment and grants 
received Entity FEDACOD Year (euros) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ACULCO 44.6
14 
 135.1
72 
 188.3
25 
379.7
65 
120.0
00 
Agricultores 
Solidarios 
 106.8
61 
 64.4
42 
57.6
25 
50.9
81 
 
Save The Children  118.0
66 
125.9
15 
257.0
40 
244.8
00 
295.0
03 
120.0
00 Foundation IUVE 
Coop. 
103.8
50 
 99.7
36 
120.7
27 
112.0
97 
78.6
74 
 
Sotermun   67.1
80 
52.1
20 
63.3
34 
  
ACOLVALLE      22.8
78 
 
Foundation Proyecto 
Senior 
    19.5
98 
 
ASOFLOES      25.6
00 
 
Valencian 
Association of 
     24.4
00 
 
Immigrants 
 
Source Compiled from the resolutions of the calls for co-development 
2006–2012 
 
other organizations who have chosen not to join the new spaces of 
participation or who simply have not yet been invited to them. In 
this sense, competition for the leadership and resources in this new 
area has opened a gap in the world of social organizations and 
weakened the possibilities of presenting alternatives to policy 
officials, a fact that has also been detected in other studies, such 
  
as that of San Martı´n (2011, p. 88) on immigrant associations in 
the city of Madrid, which speaks of a painting competition and 
cooperation between actors driven by the government’s agenda. 
However, as we have seen above, most of the co-development 
project grants have been received by foundations and large NGOs 
not necessarily linked to FEDACOD. Anyway, in 2011, one year 
after the creation of the federation, we see a notable jump (see 
Table 5), and nine of the entities belonging to FEDACOD (among 
which are the association of Colombian immigrants ACULCO and 
Save The Children Foundation) received 896,899 euros of a total 
of 3,051,691, equivalent to almost a third of the total.12 Similarly, in 
2012, at a time when the number of subsidized projects was 
reduced considerably (from 20 in 2011 down to 10 in 2012), both 
entities—ACULCO and Save The Children—were again selected 
projects and the amounts received highest among all approved. 
 
Conclusions 
This article has addressed what were some of the main risks and 
opportunities that co-development policies have generated for 
immigrant associations, from the analysis of the case of Valencia in 
the last decade. Over recent years, many immigrant associations 
have joined the co-development language, and some have spoken 
in this new area, developing their own projects or working with 
development organizations. However, this new type of participation 
has also generated many questions and debates. The main 
criticisms have focused specifically on the role that government 
institutions have played in the implementation of new policies and 
related devices, as well as the type of relationship that would have 
been established between immigrant associations and 
administrations, on the one hand, and between the first associations 
and NGOs on the other. 
As we have seen, co-development policies have arisen largely 
as a window of opportunity for immigrant associations, although the 
main beneficiaries would not have been the latter, but rather the 
foundations and NGOs. On the other hand, despite the possible 
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 In the call for 2011, a total of 22 organizations’ projects were approved, of which 
9 belong to FEDACOD 
  
‘‘opportunity’’ that co-development represents, not all immigrant 
associations, nor NGOs, have known or wanted to take it. Some 
entities have been very critical, warning of the dangers of co-
optation and loss of independence, while others have been left out 
by not having the skills and resources necessary to access the 
established channels. On the whole, co-development policies, at 
least in the case of Valencia, have created a scenario for which not 
all actors were ready, and some of them were yet to appear or be 
sufficiently strengthened. 
The institutional framework for co-development created in 
Valencia has experienced many inconsistencies, including (and 
perhaps primarily) the fact that there is a protagonist—an 
organized migrant—who is not necessarily the beneficiary of the 
actions planned. On the other hand, the reduction of co- 
development devices to the formulation of the model based 
development cooperation projects tended to marginalize those 
initiatives that involve immigrant associations being made in a 
more informal way. The result is that we tend to consider as co-
development those actions or projects that have been designed for 
concurrency in public calls (whether or not they were eventually 
funded), while many other activities at source are presented only 
as a commitment to their own communities. 
The opportunity that co-development should have represented 
for immigrant associations has depended largely on the context in 
which it has been developing its work. For Valencia, the 
peculiarities of the political and institutional context in which it has 
developed co-development have not necessarily led to a 
strengthening of immigrant associations, although multiplication 
has occurred. In some cases, partnerships have been able to 
acquire increased resources or a greater role in some spaces of 
representation, but as has happened in other areas, this has not 
been accompanied by a real advocacy capacity. It seems instead 
that the aim has been to encourage partnerships as instances of 
representation, dialog and mediation between the immigrants 
themselves and administration by an extension of associations, but 
without the ability to set the political agenda. 
  
 
The recognition of migrants as agents of development has 
given these organizations some public prominence (some 
associations have grown considerably and have provided significant 
financial resources), but at the cost of modernization and the 
relegation of the more demanding part of their agendas. Policies 
that have tried to turn migrants into transnational actors have also 
caused the conversion of socio-cultural associations of immigrants 
into development associations, but without taking into account their 
capacity to take on this new challenge. 
The character which largely induced co-development has also 
been supported in the configuration of a new associative framed 
representation in new platforms that have not given voice to 
immigrants but rather generated loyalty, according to the 
terminology of Hirschman (1977). Returning to the three possible 
responses for the inefficient behavior of institutions, we can 
conclude that the policies of co- development in Valencia have 
revolved more around ensuring loyalty (loyalties), while voice 
(voices) has been relegated to small associations located in the 
periphery of the institutional environment (exit). The potential 
enclosing the original idea of co-development, in terms of 
participation and a new transnational citizenship, has been diluted 
by attempts of political institutionalization. The result is that despite 
the novelty represented by co-development, it has been discredited 
in many areas and there is already great reluctance to use the 
same term between immigrant associations and development 
organizations. 
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